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as collateral to a lender, and the lender 
sells the security to a third party, a 
practice known as rehypothecation. 
although such practices may be 
hard for nontraders to understand, 
nonetheless, rehypothecation is 
widespread in financial markets. 
it is easy to understand why a 
secured lender — a lender whose 
loans have been collateralized with 
a security — would want to put the 
security (that is, the collateral) to a 
profitable use. after all, if the borrower 
repays his loan, the lender could always 
use the proceeds to re-purchase the 
security and transfer it back to the 
borrower. and if the borrower defaults, 
the lender simply keeps the security.  it 
is more difficult to see why a borrower 
would consent to this practice: The 
borrower must take into account the 
risk that the lender will not return 
his collateral when the borrower 
repays his loan.  This risk is amplified 
when the borrower has consented to 
rehypothecation.
Following the crisis of 2007-
2009, the Dodd-Frank act, which 
was passed by Congress in July 2010, 
put restrictions on rehypothecation 
for derivatives. To understand the 
scope of these restrictions, we need to 
understand the role of rehypothecation 
in financial trades. Which party to 
a financial trade does it benefit? are 
there limits to the advantages of 
rehypothecation?  and, in the end, 
how should it be regulated?  There 
are no hard and fast answers to the 
last question, but we can make a more 
informed decision about the pros and 
cons of various forms of regulations 
if we understand the underlying 
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COUNTERPARTY RISK
AND COLLATERAL
To understand the use of 
rehypothecation in financial markets 
and its consequences, it is first 
important to understand why and how 
trades are collateralized. 
Traders demand collateral to 
insure against counterparty risk — the 
risk that the party they are trading 
with (their counterparty) defaults. 
Counterparty risk is more acute for 
long-term contractual obligations 
such as commodity futures or forward 
contracts — obligations to deliver a 
given quantity of a commodity (pork-
bellies, soybeans, oil, etc.) at a fixed 
price, on a given date in the future.1 in 
this article i will focus on commodity 
contracts just for concreteness, but the 
arguments also apply more generally. 
broadly, default comes in two 
types.  First, traders may not fulfill 
their promises if it is not in their best 
interest to do so. This type of default 
is called strategic default. Second, the 
creditworthiness of each party to the 
trade can deteriorate over time, the 
results of poor market conditions or 
bad investments. if a trader defaults 
because it is insolvent, we say that this 
is a nonstrategic default. To illustrate, 
suppose that an onion farmer who 
wants to insure against the fluctuation 
of onion prices signs a forward contract 
with a merchant promising to deliver 
100 onions at $1 each on May 1, 2011. 
if the crops are bad, the farmer may be 
unable to deliver 100 onions. There is 
not much traders can do to limit this 
default event because it is nonstrategic. 
alternatively, price movements can 
trigger a strategic default:  if the price 
of onions on May 1 is $2, the farmer 
has a strong incentive to renege on 
his promise and sell his 100 onions 
elsewhere for $2 each. More generally, 
if the price goes down, the buyer has 
a strong incentive to renege on its 
promises to pay the (higher) contract 
price, while if the price goes up, the 
seller has a strong incentive to renege 
on its promise to deliver the good at 
the (lower) contract price.
 as a general rule, price 
fluctuations are very likely over time 
and creditworthiness is more likely to 
deteriorate over a longer time horizon.  
So contracts with a long maturity 
date, that is, contracts with settlement 
dates far in the future, are more prone 
to default by one of the traders, be it 
strategic or nonstrategic.
Requiring collateral is a 
nearly universal contractual way to 
address these risks of default. When 
traders carry out their business on 
an organized exchange, such as 
the Chicago Mercantile exchange 
(CMe), the exchange’s clearing agent 
handles collateral requirements (CMe 
Clearing, in the case of the CMe), 
and there is little traders can do to 
modify these requirements. however, 
many other contracts, such as forward 
contracts, are traded over-the-counter 
and not on an organized exchange. 
in over-the-counter markets, traders 
directly negotiate bilateral contracts, 
including collateral requirements. 
The amount of required collateral 
typically depends on the observable 
creditworthiness of the counterparty 
(for example, their credit rating), as 
well as overall market conditions, 
to control for strategic default. For 
example, if the price of onions falls 
between the day the contract is signed 
and the delivery date, the merchant 
may have to pledge more collateral; 
if the price increases, the farmer 
may have to pledge more collateral. 
Notice that the requirement to pledge 
collateral may switch from one party to 
the next, depending on how the price 
of onions moves. as a consequence, 
it is hard to predict who will need to 
pledge collateral at the time traders 
agree to a trade. To avoid confusion, 
i will refer to the trader who receives 
the collateral as the receiver and the 
one who offers the collateral as the 
pledgor. in our example, the pledgor 
will be the merchant if the price of 
onions goes down or the farmer if 
the price of onions goes up.  Notice 
also that collateral requirements 
serve two distinct functions.  First, 
collateral limits the receiver’s losses in 
the event of default, whether strategic 
or nonstrategic.  Second, collateral 
actually reduces strategic default by 
raising the pledgor’s costs of defaulting.
The failure to pledge the required 
collateral generally triggers a default 
event that can terminate the trade.2 
however, posting collateral is costly, 
since traders have to keep assets, 
including cash, in reserve, for the sole 
purpose of securing their positions if 
need be, and they have to forgo the 
potential benefits of investing the 
1 a forward contract differs from a futures 
contract in that it is traded over-the-counter, 
i.e., traders negotiate the terms of the contract 
between themselves, while a futures contract is 
traded on a centralized exchange.  
Traders demand collateral to insure against 
counterparty risk — the risk that the party they 
are trading with (their counterparty) defaults.
2 When a trade is terminated, the obligations 
are cancelled and the collateral is returned to 
its owner. 20   Q4  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
assets somewhere else. Thus, traders 
have strong incentives to develop ways 
to conserve collateral. This is where 
rehypothecation plays a role.
REHYPOTHECATION, OR HOW 
TO SAVE ON COLLATERAL
before explaining how 
rehypothecation works, let me define 
what it is precisely. There are two 
notions of rehypothecation. The first 
(narrow) notion of rehypothecation 
relates to how broker-dealers3 (and 
no other market participants) 
should handle the securities of 
their customers: if they can use 
their customers’ securities as they 
see fit, we say that broker-dealers 
enjoy a rehypothecation right. The 
second notion, as proposed by the 
international Swaps and Derivatives 
association (iSDa), applies to any 
secured lender, not only to broker-
dealers: The right of rehypothecation 
refers to the right of a secured party 
to sell, pledge, rehypothecate (in its 
narrow definition above), assign, 
invest, use, commingle, or otherwise 
dispose of posted collateral. in 
what follows, i will use the broader 
definition of rehypothecation, which, 
simply put, says that a lender with 
collateral can use it as if it was his own 
asset.
Now, picture yourself as a trader 
on an over-the-counter market. if 
business is good, you will be involved 
in many repeated interactions with 
traders at other firms. you will have 
to take thousands of positions during 
a typical day. So you can see that 
negotiating every aspect of each 
contract will be costly and very 
inefficient, since it would slow down 
your trading activity and others’. So, 
in order to speed things up, market 
participants typically transact under 
standardized contractual terms known 
as a Master Agreement. 
Three Types of Master 
Agreements. a Master agreement 
is a standardized form that specifies 
not only the terms of a trade, such 
as the price and the assets to be 
delivered, but also what constitutes 
events of default and termination 
events. These Master agreements 
reduce legal uncertainty about how 
disputes will be resolved. The precise 
terms have evolved over time through 
the resolution of past disputes.  Now, 
when two traders choose a Master 
agreement, there is a body of case law 
that tells the contracting parties what 
the terms actually mean, how judges 
will interpret them, and so forth.  in 
particular, a Master agreement will 
specify the rights of the parties to a 
trade regarding the use of collateral in 
protecting their exposures. The most 
common Master agreement is the 
iSDa Master agreement. 
To complement its Master 
agreement, the iSDa provides three 
standard templates for handling 
collateral, known as the iSDa Credit 
Support annexes.  There are three 
types of Credit Support annexes, 
and legally, they treat the handling of 
collateral very differently. Under the 
English Credit Support Deed (CSD) 
the pledgor remains the owner of the 
asset, and the receiver must open 
a segregated account in which the 
collateral cannot be combined with 
his own property. So the english CSD 
simply prohibits the reuse of collateral.
This is not the case under the 
New York Credit Support Annex (CSA). 
although the pledgor remains the 
owner of the asset, the receiver gains 
broad rights to use the collateral. 
in particular, the receiver can 
rehypothecate any posted collateral 
it holds. by using the New york CSa 
and agreeing to rehypothecation, 
the pledgor gives up his right of 
redemption, that is, the pledgor loses 
his right to reclaim his collateral in 
case the receiver’s exposure to the 
pledgor declines. Giving the pledgor 
an open-ended right to redeem 
collateral whenever the receiver’s 
exposure changes would make it nearly 
impossible for the receiver to use the 
collateral in another transaction; after 
all, prices are constantly changing. 
Traders can choose to amend the New 
york CSa to disengage the provisions 
that make rehypothecation possible. 
however, we will see that this does not 
seem to happen in practice.
Finally, under the English CSA, 
the pledgor loses ownership over 
the pledged asset, and instead, the 
receiver gains full legal ownership of 
the collateral. however, and contrary 
to the New york CSa, the receiver has 
the obligation to return “equivalent” 
To complement its Master Agreement, 
the ISDA provides three standard 
templates for handling collateral, known 
as the ISDA Credit Support Annexes. 
3 Under the Securities exchange act of 1934, 
a “broker” is defined as “any person engaged in 
the business of effecting transactions in securi-
ties for the account of others.” a “dealer” is 
defined as “any person engaged in the business 
of buying and selling securities for [his] own 
account, through a broker or otherwise.” if the 
person performs these functions on a private 
basis and not as a business, he is considered 
a trader. Depending on the securities traded, 
a significant proportion of trades can be con-
ducted by broker-dealers.Business Review  Q4  2011   21 www.philadelphiafed.org
property when the pledgor’s exposure 
is reduced. To provide additional 
flexibility, traders can define the 
meaning of “equivalent” in the english 
CSa. 
Why Choose One Type Over 
Another? There are reasons traders 
might prefer the New york CSa over 
the english CSa or vice versa. it is 
clear that the receiver enjoys more 
flexibility under the english CSa, 
since the receiver can return any type 
of collateral as long as it is judged 
equivalent.  however, this flexibility 
imposes legal risk on the pledgor, who 
may not agree with either the receiver 
or a court that the collateral provided 
is truly equivalent. Then, why would 
the pledgor accept the english CSa? 
When negotiating the terms of trades, 
the pledgor may still accept this type 
of agreement if he gets a better price 
in exchange for the additional risk. 
Unfortunately, there are no data on 
the relative use of english versus New 
york CSas, so it is difficult to check 
whether the price terms actually reflect 
this flexibility-risk tradeoff. 
however, actual contracting prac-
tices strongly suggest that rehypotheca-
tion is useful. Traders could choose 
to prohibit rehypothecation, either by 
using an english CSD or by amending 
a New york CSa. but, interestingly, a 
high proportion of large traders choose 
to allow rehypothecation. From the 
2010 iSDa margin survey, 44 percent 
of all respondents to the survey and 93 
percent of large dealers report rehy-
pothecating collateral.  To put these 
numbers in some perspective, the 
survey was conducted after one of the 
most serious disturbances to financial 
markets in decades.  as i will discuss 
later, the risk that a pledgor would be 
unable to recover his collateral became 
very real during the financial distur-
bances of 2008.  Nonetheless, just 
over a year later, significant fractions 
of traders were willing to bear these 
risks again.  Given that traders have a 
choice, rehypothecation appears to be 
useful. but how?  
Rehypothecation Increases 
Market Liquidity When Collateral 
Is Scarce.  Rehypothecation lowers 
traders’ funding liquidity needs, the 
ease with which a trader can obtain 
funding. This is quite intuitive. When 
traders use rehypothecation, the 
receiver can again pledge collateral to 
borrow cash. Thus, the same collateral 
can be used to support more than one 
transaction, making it (more) liquid. 
So rehypothecation allows the receiver 
to fund his activity easily, rather than 
having to scramble for cash or to 
mobilize other assets on his balance 
sheet. For example, suppose that in 
addition to the onion futures, our 
merchant also bought apple futures 
for $2 and received $1 of collateral 
for them. Now suppose onion prices 
fall to 50 cents but there is no change 
in apple prices. it is then very likely 
that the onion farmer will demand 
more collateral, and in this case, our 
merchant could use the $1 pledged by 
the apple farmer to satisfy this added 
collateral requirement rather than use 
his own reserves. 
Lowering traders’ funding liquidity 
needs is important because it has 
market-wide effects. Funding liquidity 
affects market liquidity, the ease 
with which a trader finds a suitable 
counterparty. When it becomes easier 
to secure funding, traders are willing 
to take on some positions that would 
otherwise require too much capital. 
This improves market liquidity by 
increasing the number of traders 
willing to take positions (see the 
article by Markus brunnermeier and 
Lasse Pedersen and the one by Ronel 
elul). and a higher degree of market 
liquidity is usually associated with a 
higher level of social welfare.
Clearly, the receiver benefits from 
rehypothecation.  but why should 
the pledgor agree to rehypothecation 
if the receiver is the real beneficiary 
while the pledgor bears more risk? 
While a more liquid market benefits 
everyone, individual traders capture 
only a small share of the total benefits 
that all traders receive from enhanced 
liquidity.  however, the receiver’s 
flexibility to reuse collateral could and 
should be reflected in more favorable 
terms of trade, at least in a competitive 
market. For example, if the pledgor 
uses cash collateral, the receiver could 
agree to pay a higher interest rate 
on this cash. Or perhaps the pledgor 
might be required to post less collateral 
if the receiver can reuse it. 
That said, the amount of 
compensation traders must receive 
for allowing their counterparties to 
repledge their collateral will depend 
on various factors.  One of these is 
market structure.  Large dealers may 
be able to exploit their position in 
order to extract more profit from their 
customers. This is consistent with 
the evidence that large dealers use 
collateral rehypothecation relatively 
more than others. also, according to 
Christian Johnson’s article, traders 
(including dealers) may refuse to trade 
if they cannot rehypothecate the 
collateral. his account is consistent 
with a market in which large dealers 
simply make a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
to all other traders.  The two-sided 
nature of the default risk is another 
factor.  Recall that traders can end up 
as pledgor or receiver, depending on 
market conditions. in this case, both 
traders have an incentive to accept 
rehypothecation, since it lowers their 
funding costs if they turn out to be the 
receiver.  as of yet, there is no formal 
empirical evidence on the relationship 
between rehypothecation and other 
contractual terms, and so it is difficult 
to evaluate the relative importance of 
these factors.22   Q4  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
REHYPOTHECATION 
AMPLIFIES MARKET STRAINS
When market conditions 
deteriorate, rehypothecation can 
amplify market strains. Simply 
put, rehypothecation re-introduces 
counterparty risk in case a trader 
fails. This makes traders wary 
about agreeing to rehypothecation 
when conditions deteriorate. as a 
consequence, funding liquidity needs 
can increase, thus amplifying market 
strains. in this section, i describe each 
step in detail. 
Rehypothecation Introduces 
Counterparty Risk.  First, consider 
what happens if a trader fails. For 
example, suppose our merchant 
goes bust having rehypothecated 
the farmer’s collateral. Legitimately, 
the farmer will want to recover his 
collateral. but since the merchant used 
it to secure another of his transactions, 
the farmer will not find it easy to get 
his collateral back.
Legally, several scenarios are 
possible. if the merchant has pledged 
the collateral to a third party, this 
third party has the right to seize the 
collateral to cover the merchant’s 
obligations. in this case, the farmer 
loses his collateral. a second possible 
scenario is when the farmer owes a 
debt to the merchant; for example, 
the merchant has made an early 
partial payment to the onion farmer 
on the total due. in this case, the 
value of the farmer’s collateral can 
be deducted from his debt. however, 
the law would treat the farmer as an 
unsecured creditor if the value of the 
collateral exceeds the value of his debt.   
as an unsecured creditor, the farmer 
will typically receive only a piece of 
the value of the collateral. in both 
scenarios, the farmer who pledged 
collateral ends up losing when the 
merchant fails. 
So rehypothecation lowers the 
trader’s coverage against counterparty 
risk. and in an interlinked market 
with rehypothecation, the actual 
amount of collateral in the market 
can be much lower than the 
amount of collateral that has been 
contractually committed. Think of a 
number of dealers linked in a chain 
of trades.  in an extreme case, each 
dealer in the chain may find that 
he isn’t collateralized at all, even if 
contracts fully collateralize traders’ 
exposure!  For example, suppose that 
the apple producer is $100 in debt 
to the merchant, who contracted a 
debt of $100 with the onion farmer, 
who himself owes a debt of $100 
to the apple producer. if they all 
rehypothecate the collateral, then the 
trades do not look collateralized at 
all. if the onion farmer defaults, no 
collateral can really be seized, and it 
is as if no collateral had been pledged. 
although this is an extreme example, 
it illustrates how rehypothecation can 
undo the beneficial effects of collateral. 
More realistically, rehypothecation 
can lead to chains of traders who 
are much less protected than they 
thought they were. The bottom line 
is that rehypothecation increases 
the same counterparty risk that the 
collateral requirement was supposed 
to tame. Note that if rehypothecation 
was prohibited or not used, the total 
available collateral would always 
equal the collateral that has been 
contractually committed, and each 
trader would recover his collateral in 
the event of default.
Thinking about chains of traders 
also helps to see another effect of 
rehypothecation: Rehypothecation 
increases the linkages between traders.  
in our example, the onion farmer 
and the third party who received 
collateral from the merchant had no 
formal contractual agreement at all. 
if you asked the onion farmer, he 
would say he had an agreement only 
with the merchant.  Nonetheless, 
the merchant’s ability to pledge the 
collateral means that the onion 
farmer and the third party are also 
interlinked. in this type of market, 
individual traders are potentially 
exposed to large numbers of 
participants with whom they have no 
formal agreement.  Note, this effect 
is in addition to the liquidity effects i 
have already discussed. 
Rehypothecation Amplifies 
Market Strains When Traders 
Become Nervous. When traders 
grow anxious about the possibility 
of a counterparty’s default, they will 
tend to deny rehypothecation rights. 
in a time of crisis, the financial health 
of market participants can change 
by the hour. as dealers grow unsure 
of the quality of their counterparty, 
they prefer to take precautionary 
measures regarding their collateral. 
So it is natural that in a time of crisis, 
dealers become reluctant to agree to 
rehypothecation, to ensure that they 
know where their collateral is. 
Unfortunately, dealers do not 
take into account the effects of their 
behavior on other traders, and this 
reversal in collateral policy makes 
funding pressures more severe. Other 
dealers might then scramble for 
collateral to secure the loans necessary 
for their business. if collateral becomes 
so scarce that dealers are unable to 
place orders to buy securities, the 
market can freeze.4 Note that although 
every individual trader may be making 
the best possible decision for himself 
or herself, traders might act quite 
differently if they could all make a 
collective decision to continue to 
accept rehypothecation agreements. 
The freeze can be inefficient if traders 
are financially sound but lack the 
necessary liquid assets. in our simple 
4 See yaron Leitner’s Business Review article on 
market freezes.Business Review  Q4  2011   23 www.philadelphiafed.org
example, while everyone would be 
better off if the (financially sound) 
merchant actually buys a forward 
contract from the onion farmer, 
the merchant’s inability to pledge 
collateral means that he will have to 
buy onions on the spot market at a 
higher price5 and will have to charge 
his clients more. This is inefficient, 
since the farmer, the merchant, and 
the merchant’s customers would have 
preferred that a forward contract be 
written before buying and selling 
on the onion market revealed the 
actual spot price. So a sudden change 
in a trader’s willingness to accept 
rehypothecation amplifies market 
strains and makes (inefficient) market 
freezes more likely. 
Unfortunately, a sudden reduction 
in the practice of rehypothecation is 
not just a theoretical possibility, since 
it happened during the financial crisis 
of 2008-2009. in their 2010 article, 
Manmohan Singh and James aitken 
show that rehypothecation declined 
rapidly after Lehman brothers failed 
on September 14, 2008. The total 
collateral pledged that could be reused 
declined from $4.5 trillion at the end 
of 2007 to $2.1 trillion at the end of 
2009. in their 2009 article, Singh and 
aitken show that the total amount of 
assets available as collateral decreased 
by up to $5 trillion as a result of 
reduced rehypothecation and collateral 
hoarding. at the same time, credit 
markets seized up.
During the height of the crisis, 
dealers found it difficult to conduct 
their business, since they could 
not find proper counterparties that 
would lend to them without stringent 
contractual guarantees. For example, 
counterparties would accept only 
Treasury securities as collateral, and 
they would apply large collateral 
haircuts.6 The Federal Reserve System 
(and other government agencies) 
viewed this market freeze as inefficient 
and felt that intervention was justified 
to “bolster market liquidity and 
promote orderly market functioning. 
Liquid, well-functioning markets 
are essential for the promotion of 
economic growth.”7  To ease large 
dealers’ funding needs, the Federal 
Reserve put in place a back-stop 
facility for dealers, the Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility (PDCF). Under this 
program, large dealers could borrow 
from the Federal Reserve’s discount 
window using as collateral a broad 
set of securities (with appropriate 
haircuts), not only Treasury securities. 
as described in the article by Tobias 
adrian, Christopher burke, and James 
Mcandrews, PDCF usage immediately 
spiked to $40 billion before receding 
progressively, as conditions in the 
financing markets improved and the 
pricing of the PDCF became less 
attractive. as tensions from the bear 
Stearns bailout abated, use of the 
PDCF stopped altogether in mid-July 
2008. but then came the failure of 
Lehman brothers on September 15. 
Perceiving that Lehman brothers’ 
difficulties could contaminate other 
dealers, lenders imposed higher 
haircuts and accepted only high-
quality securities as collateral. as 
a result, dealers struggled to obtain 
funding. as a preventive policy, the 
Fed expanded the types of PDCF-
eligible collateral on September 14. as 
a result, PDCF usage exploded to $59.7 
billion on Wednesday, September 17, 
from no activity during the previous 
week. eventually, PDCF borrowing 
reached more than $140 billion in 
October 2008. adrian, burke, and 
Mcandrews conclude that in this 
instance, the PDCF fulfilled one of the 
purposes for which it was intended: 
to be available in the event that a 
failure of a primary dealer led to severe 




The possibility that (the lack 
of) rehypothecation can amplify 
During the height of 
the crisis, dealers 
found it difficult 
to conduct their 
business, since 
they could not find 
proper counterparties 
that would lend 
to them without 
stringent contractual 
guarantees.
7 From the March 16, 2008 press release from 
the Federal Reserve board announcing the 
creation of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
(PDCF).
5 a spot market is a market in which goods or 
securities are traded for cash, and each transac-
tion is settled immediately.
6 a haircut is a percentage that is subtracted 
from the value of the collateral. hence, only 
collateral worth more than $100 will be ac-
cepted to secure a $90 loan with a 10 percent 
haircut. 
8 The act stipulates that (a) “a futures com-
mission merchant shall treat and deal with all 
money, securities, and property of any swaps 
customer received to margin, guarantee or 
secure a swap cleared by or through a deriva-
tives clearing organization as belonging to the 
swaps customer,’’ and (b) “Money, securities, 
and property of a swaps customer described in 
(a) shall be separately accounted for and shall 
not be commingled with the funds of the future 
commission merchant or be used to margin, 
secure or guarantee any trades or contracts of 
any swaps customer or person other than the 
person for whom the same are held.”  24   Q4  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
view rehypothecation as valuable 
in itself.  if traders did not find the 
benefits of rehypothecation greater 
than the costs, they did have means 
for preventing its practice.  Traders 
could prohibit rehypothecation by, 
for instance, amending the New york 
CSa.10 a second option is to use an 
english CSD. This option is rather 
inexpensive and guarantees that the 
pledgor will get his collateral back. 
The fact that some traders did not rely 
on either option suggests that they 
may have seen value in the practice, 
and that limiting rehypothecation via 
regulation may impose costs.   
alternatively, we can’t rule 
out the possibility that the practice 
occurred because some participants 
were able to exploit their market 
power to impose rehypothecation on 
other traders. if the receiver has a 
monopoly over the provision of some 
securities, he can cut out any trader 
who refuses the rehypothecation of 
his collateral. in this case, we would 
also observe that market participants 
use rehypothecation during moments 
of stress, not because they want to 
but because they have to. in this case, 
limiting rehypothecation is an indirect 
way of addressing abusive positions in 
financial markets.    
market strains and lead to inefficient 
market freezes provides a partial 
rationale for the Dodd-Frank act’s 
prohibition against rehypothecation 
for many derivative transactions. 
Precisely, the Dodd-Frank act limits 
rehypothecation by requiring that 
most swap contracts be cleared by 
a derivatives clearing organization, 
such as a central counterparty, and 
that the collateral pledged be held 
in a segregated account with no 
possibility of rehypothecation.8 These 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank act 
will limit rehypothecation because a 
central counterparty imposes collateral 
requirements to clear trades and holds 
the collateral on behalf of the traders.9 
Therefore, the central counterparty is 
the sole receiver of the collateral, and 
it will not be rehypothecated. Other 
contracts that are not considered 
swap contracts under the act are not 
(yet) subject to these requirements 
(for example, commodity futures or 
some security futures). While a limit 
to rehypothecation will make trading 
safer for those market participants who 
need to pledge collateral, there may be 
significant costs to limiting this market 
practice for most derivatives contracts: 
The cost of pledging collateral may 
increase, funding liquidity needs may 
become more severe, and overall 
market liquidity may deteriorate. 
During the financial crisis, 
in spite of increased counterparty 
risk, derivatives traders still agreed 
to rehypothecation (although at a 
lower level than before the crisis) 
and continued to do so after the 
crisis receded, as shown by Singh and 
aitken in their 2010 article. This use 
of rehypothecation even under adverse 
conditions might suggest that traders 
9 See my earlier Business Review article or my 
working paper with Thorsten Koeppl for more 
details on central counterparty clearing.
Alternatively, we can’t rule out the 
possibility that the practice occurred 
because some participants were able 
to exploit their market power to impose 
rehypothecation on other traders.
in light of the evidence of 
the use of rehypothecation, both 
theories are plausible, although they 
have very different implications for 
regulators.  Unfortunately, without 
more micro-level data on the use of 
rehypothecation, it is difficult to know 
which of the two theories is correct. 
CONCLUSION
before the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank bill, rehypothecation was 
widely used by market participants. 
in this article, i have tried to explain 
why this is so while also highlighting 
some of the drawbacks to individual 
traders and to the market as a whole. 
in a nutshell, rehypothecation reduces 
the cost of pledging collateral, it 
reduces funding liquidity needs, and 
it improves market liquidity. however, 
rehypothecation carries problems of 
its own, since it seemingly has the 
potential to introduce market-wide 
counterparty risks that are difficult 
for a single trader to control and can 
amplify market strains.
While, at this stage, it is not 
clear if rehypothecation should be 
encouraged or limited, the Dodd-
Frank act took the stance that the 
uncertainties in cases of default 
were too strong to leave current 
rehypothecation and clearing 
practices in place. although central 
counterparty clearing is desirable 
for standardized contracts, it 
remains to be seen how prohibiting 
rehypothecation will affect the 
derivatives markets. B R
10 it is true that this option is costly, since 
traders who want to amend a CSa would need 
to agree on the content of the amendment. be-
cause negotiation takes time, adding an amend-
ment in itself might defeat the whole purpose of 
using a Master agreement, and, in fact, it seems 
that the credit annexes are rarely amended.Business Review  Q4  2011   25 www.philadelphiafed.org
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